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This study deals with the development of the oil industry in modern
Japan. During the interwar period and throughout the postwar era until
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?? Introduction
This study deals with the development of the oil industry in modern Japan.
During the interwar period and throughout the postwar era until recently, the
Japanese petroleum industry was one of the most extensively regulated
business sectors in the Japanese economy, and the oil market was one of the
most widely intervened in by the government in the postwar era. ?Mito,
2001 ; Oyama Kosuke, 1996 and Richard J. Samuels, 1987?. Through an
analysis of the initial development of this highly regulated industry, the main
aim of this paper is to investigate the fundamental nature of modern Japanese
capitalism, looking specifically at questions such as how it emerged, what
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recently, the petroleum industry was one of the most extensively
regulated business sectors in the Japanese economy, and the oil market
was one of these most widely intervened in by the government. Through
an analysis of the initial development of this highly regulated industry, the
main aim of this paper is to investigate the fundamental nature of modern
Japanese capitalism, looking specifically at questions such as how it
emerged, what determined its initial structure, how the market was
governed, and what role the government played in its initial development.
Historically, the Imperial government took initiatives and consciously
laid solid foundations and the crucial infrastructure required for the rapid
transformation of an agrarian-based economy into a ‘wealthy nation,
strong army’. As a result of these initiatives, Japan managed to escape
from colonization by Western Imperial Powers. This paper demonstrates,
however, that the market which emerged in modern Japan was not state-
led or state-governed. Rather, it was close to what we may term a
“laissez faire economy.” In the early stage of economic development, the
government’s intervention in the market was minimal. It acted almost as
a referee or an umpire of competing societal conflicts, as envisioned in the
classical pluralist model of the political economy and market, rather than
as a loco-motive of industrialization as embodied in the statist view of
Japan.
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determined its initial structure, how the market was governed, and what role
the government played in its initial development.
Historically, the Imperial Government and Japan’s modern elites took
initiatives and consciously laid solid foundations and the crucial infrastructure
required for the rapid transformation of an agrarian-based economy into a
‘wealthy nation, strong army’ ?Allen, 1972?. As a result of these initiatives,
Japan managed to escape from colonization by Western Imperial Powers.
This study has two major objectives. One is to demonstrate that despite
these earlier modernization measures taken by the government, the oil
market which emerged in modern Japan was not state-led or state-governed.
Rather, it was close to what we may call a ‘laissez faire economy.’ The
government acted almost as a referee or an umpire of competing societal
conflicts as envisioned in the classical pluralist model of the political
economy and market, rather than as a locomotive of industrialization as
embodied in the view of Japan as the statist or developmental state ?Mito,
1993 and 2001?. The other objective of this paper is to examine the impact
of the ‘laissez faire’ policy on the growth, structure and performance of the
oil industry in modern Japan.
The major thesis of this paper is as follows : the growth of the oil industry
in early modern Japan was dictated by market demand for various oil
products with primitive technology and poor capital ; the absence of
regulation in the oil industry and fierce market competition in the early
modern era led to volatile structural change through bankruptcies, mergers
and acquisitions in the oil sector ; the oil companies which survived the
volatile market experienced relatively high return on profits against assets
employed ; more importantly, the tariff policy which Japan imposed on oil
?
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once it gained the power to do so after the revision of unequal treaties with
Western powers was the major policy measure which drastically changed the
structure and performance of this industry, despite the fact that the modern
Japanese government did not have an industrial policy for the oil sector.
This paper introduces a framework for an analysis before the case study
and then discusses the emergence and growth of the oil industry in modern
Japan. It then examines its structural characteristics and performance. The
study of market governance in the oil sector will be reinforced by an analysis
of business entry barriers for foreign and Japanese new firms entering the oil
market. It will, thirdly, investigate how business interests shaped govern-
ment policy and how and to what extent government policy in turn influenced
the initial development of the oil industry in modern Japan. The ultimate
focus of this analysis is the impact of public policy on industrial development
vis-a-vis the influence of both domestic and international forces on the
development of the oil industry in early modern Japan.
This paper is a case study based on a single industrial sector. Its findings
and wider implications should be treated in the light of these limits. A
comprehensive picture of the emergence of Japan’s modern capitalism should
be viewed in conjunction with studies of other industrial sectors. It is hoped,
however, that this study will contribute to a further understanding of the
basic nature of modern Japanese capitalism and industrial development in its
early days.
?? Methodological Consideration
Central to this study is the concept of ‘industrial development’. Unless
this is quantitatively measurable or qualitatively identifiable, it is difficult to
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establish the direct link between government actions and the development of
industrial sectors. For analytical convenience, the key term, ‘industrial
development’ can be defined as changes and continuities in the ‘growth,’
‘structure’ and ‘performance’ of an industry
1
.
The growth ?or de-growth? of an industry can be measured as increases
?or decreases? in production output or revenue over time. One may also add
many other dimensions, such as changes in assets. Or if it is a labor
intensive industry, it may be sensible to include the number of workers as a
major indicator of industrial growth. In the case of the oil industry, an
example of the most capital intensive, the use of the number of workers may
not be a good indicator for industrial growth. In this case, growth would be
more clearly indicated by changes in production, revenue or assets of all the
firms in the industry.
‘Industrial structure’ also has many important dimensions. Included here
are three structural characteristics. One is the ownership structure of firms.
This ranges from 100 percent state-owned companies to 100 per cent
privately-owned firms, like Anglo-American oil companies. The second
important dimension is the number of firms in a particular industrial sector,
and the other, their relative power in the market. The latter can be
measured in terms of relative sales share among the various companies that
constitute the market. Hence, ‘structural change’ can be defined as changes
in the number of firms, ownership and the relative market share among
them.
If there is only one firm in the sector, there exists a monopoly market as
in the case of the tobacco industry or until recent decades, domestic or
international telephone and telegraph industries in Japan. Often they were
?
?
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100 per cent state-owned companies. Unless the prices of their products and
services are regulated by the authorities, there is a high possibility that
consumers are over-charged and the company makes unusually high profits.
If the sector consists of only a few major firms, which implicitly or explicitly
coordinate their production outputs or pricing, so as to maximize profits,
then, there is an oligopoly market. As there is little competition among the
firms in an oligopoly market, consumers may be unfairly charged. If there is
more than one firm competing against another in the market, however, then
prospects for intense competition between them are high, and this is viewed
as positive for efficient demand-supply management ?or efficient allocation of
resources? which results in more benefits for consumers, according to classic
economic theory. ?Roger Clarke, 1986?. In many economies, the govern-
ment enacts an anti-monopoly law and regulates market concentration and
coordination among firms so as to increase competition and efficiency, and to
protect consumer interest.
The ‘performance’ of an industry can be measured in terms of its
profitability or financial health through many quantifiable variables. Among
them are profits / sales ratio, profit / capital ratio, self capitalization ratio, or
simply dividends. Of these, profit / sales ratio is trading profit / turnover as
expressed as a percentage. Faced with competition, management may set a
relatively low margin so as to increase market share. Sometimes, it may
decide to accept a low margin so as to meet the initial investment cost of
business expansion, including production facility investment, purchase of
new technologies or launching of a new product. In general, however, low
margin means poor performance.
Profit / capital ratio is sometimes called return on capital employed
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?ROCE? and this is also expressed as a percentage, and ROCE is often
regarded as the most important indicator of profitability. ?Geoffrey Holmes
and Alan Sugden, 1986, p. 168?. Self capitalization ratio ?SCR? is a gearing
ratio widely used in Japanese financial analysis, and is defined as the ratio
derived from the following equation : SCR??ordinary shares?reserves?
goodwill??total capital employed?. The total capital employed includes loan
capital and bank overdrafts. Thus, SCR is different from debt /equity ratio,
which is borrowing / shareholders’ funds or ‘leverage’ in American financial
analysis. However, SCR, debt /equity ratio, or ‘leverage’ are all concerned
with the proportion of capital employed, which is borrowed in relation to the
proportion based in shareholders’ funds.
Dividends do not require much elaboration. They are investment returns
for shareholders who take higher financial risks than the providers of
subordinated debts and secured loans. It is often argued, however, that
Japanese companies are less concerned with constantly paying relatively high
dividends at bad times. They tend to cut dividends in order to maintain the
system of long-term employment rather than making their employees
redundant. ?Masahiko Aoki, 1987 : 265?.
?? The Birth and Growth of a Modern Oil Industry in Japan
The first mention of oil in Japanese history dates back to 668 AD when oil
was presented to Emperor Tenji as burning soil and water from an area now
part of Niigata prefecture on the Sea of Japan side, as reported in Nihon
Shoki, Japan’s first written history completed in approximately year 720. Yet,
it was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that large-scale
commercial exploration began in the country. Once its use as lamp oil was
?
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Table 1 Japanese Oil Production and Kerosene Imports, 18681892
Year
?A?
Domestic
Production
?Kl?
?B?
Oil
Imports
?Kl?
?C
Kerosene
Imports
?Kl?
AA?C
CB
???
AA?B
1868   121   
1869   22   
1870   199   
1871   577   
1872   1,691   
1873   3,789   
1874 555  4,888 10.20  
1875 871  10,506 7.66  
1876 1,471  10,935 11.86  
1877 1,825  10,153 15.24  
1878 3,413  40,458 7.78  
1879 4,477  67,379 6.23  
1880 4,145  56,387 6.85  
1881 3,197  30,311 9.54  
1882 3,701  78,291 4.51  
1883 3,907  89,454 4.18  
1884 5,329  66,377 7.43  
1885 5,580  66,760 7.71  
1886 7,236  95,015 7.08  
1887 5,467  79,717 6.42  
1888 12,557  107,914 10.42  
1889 10,079  140,057 6.71  
1890 9,814  161,500 5.73  
1891 10,099  153,242 6.18  
1892 13,150  123,743 9.61  
Sources : complied from data in Tosuke Inokuchi, Gendai Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi, II : Sekiyu
?The history of modern Japanese industrial development, Vol. 2 : ol? ?Tokyo : Gendai Nihon
Sangyo Hattatsushi Kenkyukai, 1963?, Appendix p. 24 ; and Akira Okabe, Sangyo no Showa
Shakaishi, 3 : Sekiyu ?The social history of industry in the Showa era,, Vol. 3 : oil? ?Tokyo :
Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1986?, p. 3. Note : no record is available for oil imports other than
kerosene as imports consisted almost entirely of this single product.
introduced to modern Japan, many small entrepreneurs attempted to produce
oil in the Niigata area ?Nihon Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1982 : 595 ; and
Daikyo Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha ; 1?. The main activities of oil companies at
the initial stages were exploration, production and marketing of lamp oil.
This was done, however, through very primitive manual methods.
In 1891 Nippon Oil succeeded in mechanized oil exploration for the first
time in Japan. As Table 1 above shows, oil production increased from 555
Kilo liters ?Kl? in 1874 to over 5000Kl levels by the mid-1880s, and to well
over 200,000K1 levels by the early twentieth century. Despite increases in
domestic production, it met less than 10 per cent of demand for oil. Around
this time, the main use was for lamps in the form of kerosene. Until 1910,
therefore, more than 95 per cent of oil imports consisted of kerosene.
?Tosuke Inokuchi, 1963, Appendix pp. 2425?. The large share of kerosene
in oil imports, however, decreased gradually with the introduction of
reasonably priced, more convenient and brighter electric lighting, and also by
increased demand for other oil products which resulted from industrialization
and motorization.
In early years many oil producers were poorly capitalized, often one-man
enterprises. They were like poorly equipped gold hunters in America or
Australia in early days. The entry barrier to oil business was extremely low.
Anyone interested could easily enter. As a result, the number of oil firms
increased from five in 1888 to 430 in 1891. During the same period, the
combined capital of these companies also increased from less than one and
half million yen to over five and half million yen. By 1897 the number of
firms had drastically decreased, owing to bankruptcies and also because of
mergers and acquisitions. So did the total capitalization of the oil industry.
?
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Table 2 Japanese Oil Production and Imports, 18931920
?A? 1
Domestic
Production
?Kl?
?B? Oil
Imports
?Kl?
?C
Kerosene
Imports
?Kl?
CB
?D? Crude
1 & Heavy
Oil in
Imports
???
A?A?B?
???
1893 16,984  188,376   
1894 27,418  210,635   
1895 26,969  167,136   
1896 37,597 208,818 207,036 99.15  15.26
1897 41,730 235,842 231,132 98.00  15.03
1898 50,646 262,826 257,051 97.80  16.16
1899 85,583 201,840 198,439 98.32  29.78
1900 138,383 263,699 256,812 97.39  34.42
1901 177,477 264,983 261,181 98.57  40.11
1902 158,362 289,846 285,725 98.58  35.33
1903 192,147 233,201 226,294 97.04  45.17
1904 193,683 314,531 309,163 98.29  38.11
1905 214,159 231,011 222,217 96.19  48.11
1906 248,663 235,069 224,964 95.70  51.41
1907 273,116 273,055 265,607 97.27  50.01
1908 296,138 284,021 273,338 96.24  51.04
1909 298,929 224,124 217,386 96.99  57.15
1910 290,086 272,338 261,074 95.86  51.58
1911 275,939 293,197 241,008 82.20 12.76 48.48
1912 263,076 251,539 217,572 86.50 5.04 51.12
1913 305,522 211,958 186,587 88.03 6.29 59.04
1914 425,400 162,290 137,097 84.48 5.82 72.39
1915 471,436 165,197 133,192 80.63 10.92 74.05
1916 467,724 112,772 89,386 79.26 9.20 80.57
1917 452,613 101,700 75,924 74.65 12.07 81.65
1918 386,523 125,390 93,712 74.74 3.84 75.51
1919 354,226 178,232 147,295 82.64 5.33 66.53
1920 351,811 186,094 139,156 74.78 8.46 65.40
Source : Tosuke Inokuchi, op.cit., Appendix pp. 2425.
The main exploration around this time was in Niigata. In the area, the
number of oil companies decreased from some 420 to 58 in a few years by the
end of 1897. The total capitalization of these companies decreased to less
than five million yen ?Inokuchi, 1963 : 95125 ; Okabe, 1986 : 7384?.
Eventually, Hoden Oil and Nippon Oil emerged as the two leading
Japanese firms among them. In particular, Hoden Oil expanded, acquiring
some 10 oil firms and three cooperatives between 1893 and 1896, and 70
small oil firms between 1902 and 1906 ?Tsusho Sangyo-sho, 1966 : 247 ;
Nihon Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1982 : 597 ; Samuel, 1987 : 168?. By 1913
the two companies combined refined more than 80 per cent of the Japanese
total. Later, when these two companies imerged in 1921, their production
share in domestic crude oil also occupied approximately 80 per cent of
domestic production ?Daikyo Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1980 ; 5?. Thus the
number of firms and their position in the oil industry changed rapidly, as it
happened in the global oil industry. Although the Japanese scale of mergers
and acquisitions was smaller than what John Rockfeller achieved in the
U.S.A. at that time, in both countries, the structure of the oil industry in
terms of the number of operating firms transformed drastically by market
forces, quite independent of government policy.
?? The Structural Characteristics of the Oil Market
It is difficult to determine changes in the relative share of the oil
companies in these early years, as there is no record. Yet, given drastic
changes in the number of companies, it is reasonable to assert that the
market share might have been quite changeable between companies, except
the trend that Hoden and Nippon Oil gradually increased their market share
?
?
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relative to the other domestic counterparts. In fact, increasing market
consolidation by Hoden and Nippon Oil in the oil market is evident from the
following two angles. One is the fact that in 1907 Hoden owned 271 oil
tanker freighters, whereas Nippon Oil had only 89 in the national railway
system, a major means of overland oil transportation at the time. Among
other companies, Rising Sun, which was a subsidiary of Shell Oil, Standard,
a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New York, and Ogura Oil owned 109, 50 and
48 oil tanker freighters respectively. Hoden’s marketing supremacy was said
to have originated from its corporate development strategy of acquiring key
oil firms, not only in the Niigata area but also in the Tokyo region, the largest
consumer market in Japan ?Okabe, 1986 : 1920?.
The other fact which supports the relatively large share of Hoden and
Nippon Oil is their share in refining capacity. In Niigata, where domestic
firms’ refining activities were concentrated, Hoden and Nippon Oil jointly
refined more than 80 per cent of the total refined oil. For example, in 1913
the two companies refined 96,480Kl and 90,303Kl out of 227,818Kl
processed in the region. The third and fourth runners Suzuki and Ogura Oil
were very small, and refined only 6,293Kl and 5,924Kl respectively ?Daikyo
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1980 : 5?. From these one can also argue that
between the two largest Japanese firms, Hoden exceeded Nippon Oil in the
refining and distribution market share. Later, when these two companies
merged in 1921, they produced approximately 80 per cent of domestic oil, the
figure comparable to their refining capacity share in the Niigata market.
The total market capitalization of Japanese oil firms was quite small,
however. The two Japanese major companies grew up independently of the
zaibatsu, the financial combines. The latter had extensive networks with
T
h
e
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
an
d
In
d
u
strial
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
in
M
o
d
e
rn
Jap
an
????120? ???? 65? 1? ?2014? 5??
political parties and state leaders. As a result, they obtained various kinds of
government support and preferential treatment for their business and
industrial activities.
For most small companies, the business environment was not stable, as
reflected in drastic reductions in the number of firms through many
bankruptcies and mergers and acquisitions. Even for fairly large Japanese
firms, at times profit levels fluctuated widely. For example, in 1898 return on
capital for Nippon Oil, a company with the largest capital base at the time, fell
from a first 10 year average of 40.04 per cent to merely 1.40 per cent. The
company paid no dividend for the first time since its inception in 1888.
Excluding this exceptional year, the average for return on capital in the first
thirty years of operation was 30.39 per cent, a comparatively high figure
showing strong performance. Its average dividend level was also high.
Excluding the figure for 1898, it averaged to 22.81 per cent between 1888
and 1909. Hoden Oil had a much higher profit : between 1894 and 1909, the
average return on capital and dividend were 26 per cent and 40 per cent
respectively ?See, Appendix 2 below?.
Beginning in 1910, market competition intensified and the profitability of
the oil industry deteriorated. As a result, between 1910 and 1915 average
return on capital for both Nippon and Hoden Oil decreased to 9.62 per cent
and 7.98 per cent respectively, which was an almost 70 per cent reduction
from the previous annual average. Average dividend levels of the two also
fell to 16.67 per cent and 13.92 per cent, i.e.., an almost 30 cut for Nippon
Oil’s shareholders, and a 65 per cent cut for Hoden’s owners. The
deteriorating performance later led to the merger of these two companies.
Thus, their profitability fluctuated quite widely during this period, owing to
?
?
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intense competition in the market.
?? The Relatively Low Hurdle for Entry by Foreign Oil Firms
Meanwhile, foreign oil companies began to enter the Japanese market with
their competitively priced oil products. In 1893 the Samuel Trading
Company of England ?later part of Royal Dutch Shell? began to import
Russian oil through Kobe, where it built a storage facility for this purpose.
Soon after Standard Oil of New York ?later part of Exxon Mobil? opened a
branch in Yokohama, and in 1902 it established a giant modern refinery on a
site next to Nippon Oil’s production facility in Niigata, setting up a subsidiary,
International Oil, with a capital of 10 million yen, the biggest oil company in
terms of capitalization at that time in Japan, and the fourth largest overseas
refinery run by Standard in their global business strategy.
Compared to this, the capital of Hoden and Nippon Oil, Japan’s two largest
firms, was respectively 0.6 and 1.2 million yen. The American refining
capacity was extremely large, capable of producing 450Kl ?2,830 barrels? per
day, whereas Hodan Oil, the largest Japanese oil refiner, only managed to
increase their capacity to 265 Kl a day by 1913. Most Japanese firms had a
refining capacity of 520Kl per day. Standard was viewed as a great threat
to the domestic oil interests ?Inokuchi, 1963 : 95125 ; Okabe,: 8 ; Daikyo
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 1980 : 45?.
Standard’s move was followed by the Samuel Trading Company, through
its subsidiary, Rising Sun Oil Corporation, which set up a refinery in Fukuoka
in 1909. It used crude oil which came mainly from Borneo. Thus, the oil
industry in modern Japan was initially established not by the government, but
by a large number of small Japanese entrepreneurs, and also by two
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international giants. Among Japanese firms, Hoden and Nippon Oil emerged
as the two leaders. As evident from the above analysis, however, they were
much smaller both in terms of capitalization and refining capacity in
comparison to the two foreign firms, Standard Oil and Rising Sun. Yet,
whether small or large, and whether foreign or domestic, the entry barrier to
the oil sector was minimal. As a result, international giants as well as a large
number of Japanese entrepreneurs could easily enter the oil business in
these early days. In this respect, one may say that the nature of Japanese
capitalism was similar to that of the United Kingdom or the United States.
The Japanese market was as open and competitive as the Anglo-Saxon
counterparts.
?? Interest Group Politics and High Tariffs on Imported Crude Oil
Despite the establishment of the largest oil refinery in Japan, Standard
found only one third of oil requirements in the country, even with an
intensive search for domestic oil with the latest technology. Moreover,
refined oil products from its non-Japanese sources were more price
competitive than oil produced from its Japanese wells. As a result, it
abandoned upstream activities in Japan in 1906, and subsequently sold the
facilities in which it had invested at least 6.5 million yen to Nippon Oil for
1.75 million yen ?Okabe : 9?.
With this change in ownership, a basic pattern of oil business operation in
prewar Japan was established, that is to say, foreign oil interests, namely,
Standard and Rising Sun, were engaged in the marketing of imported oil
products independently of or jointly with Japanese distributors, whereas
domestic firms were active not only in domestic oil production, but also
?
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refining and marketing of domestic oil. Both the capital base and
technological skills of the domestic firms were extremely low, especially at
the early stage, in comparison to those of the oil majors by any standard.
Meanwhile, as imported oil was cheaper than domestic oil, Japanese oil
producers pressured the government and, in 1899, succeeded in the
introduction of tariffs on imported oil products, the first tariffs which the
government imposed, as it regained the rights to do so through the revision
of unequal treaties with Western powers.
Soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 19041905, a few Californian oil
companies, which found marketing at home difficult in competition with
Standard, tried to dump crude oil in Japan, concluding a supply agreement
with Soichiro Asano, President of Toyo Kisen, a major shipping company. As
a vehicle to import the American oil, he set up Nanboku Oil, building a
refinery in Hodogaya in Tokyo region, the first attempt of ‘refining imported
crude oil on the consumers’ door step ?shohichi-seisei-shugi?\
The domestic producers were alarmed. Led by Hisahiro Naito of Nippon
Oil, they lobbied the government to increase tariffs on imported crude oil.
During the Russo Japanese war, the government temporarily increased tariffs
on oil to 50 per cent of the imported prices, so as to finance the expensive
war. In 1906 when a new tariff system was introduced, however, oil tariffs
were drastically reduced to a 20 per cent level. Exceptions were kerosene
and lubrication oil, whose tariffs remained at the 50 per cent level. Crude oil
imports would have attracted 20 per cent tariffs, like gasoline and residual
fuels oil. Because of protests from the domestic producers, however, the
tariffs on crude oil imports were raised to the 50 per cent level ?Tsusan
Sangyo-sho : 326327?. Higher tariffs were also attractive for the govern-
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ment as they provided more revenue ?Inokuchi : 137137?. Yet, the amount
of crude oil was small in quantity. If the major objective of the government
had been to increase oil revenue, a more effective option would have been to
impose higher tariffs on imported products rather than on crude oil, as the
former occupied most of imported oil.
Back in the United States, Standard took pre-emptive action to prevent the
possible disturbance which might be caused by Californian oil firms. It
eventually gained control and acquired them. In Japan, Nanboku Oil, losing
its oil suppliers, was subsequently acquired by Hoden Oil. At the same time,
increased tariffs imposed on crude oil made even well-capitalized Rising Sun
abandon the practice of refining imported crude oil in Japan. The company
closed the modern Fukuoka refinery in 1915 and began marketing imported
refined oil products ?Inokuchi : 136143 ; Okabe : 1213?.
Thus, even in the undemocratic monarchy, interest group politics
prevailed and domestic producers succeeded in persuading the government
to raise high tariff barriers against the import of crude oil. This in turn led to
the two different types of oil business operations in modern Japan. Foreign
oil firms concentrated in the import of refined oil products, and their
marketing and domestic companies became integrated oil firms, active both
in upstream exploration and downstream refining and sales.
The Imperial Government’s first involvement with oil was the Mining Act
of 1874, which offered private interests metal and mineral mining rights,
?
?
?? Minimal Government Intervention in the Oil Market and the
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including those for oil exploration. It also specified tax and lease fee levels.
Its first direct contact with the oil business, however, came one year later
when it permitted three Japanese businessmen to employ an oil man from
the United States to explore for oil in Niigata.
The government’s interest in oil was minimal at this early stage of
industrial development. Despite the government’s major policy slogan of a
Wealthy Nation and a Strong Army, oil did not constitute part of this strategy,
as the major use for oil was in lamps, and its industrial use for power and
lubrication was highly limited. It did not have military or strategic
importance either, in early days. Its importance in trade balance was small.
In fact, Shigenobu Ohkuma, a leading Meiji leader familiar with development
in the West, condemned an advocate who contended that Japan would
collapse with the import of lamp oil. Ohkuma argued that Japan’s import of
oil was so small that it deserved no such concern, and complained that such
advocacy indicated that nobody knew anything about oil in Japan ?Itoh, 1914 :
191 ; Inokuchi : 110?.
Ohkuma and other Meiji leaders were, however, concerned with the
foreign domination of the Japanese market in this industrial sector, and
encouraged Japanese firms to cooperate together to promote national
interests ?Okabe : 8 ; Itoh : 340341 ; Inokuchi : 110?. Shinpei Gotoh and
Masayoshi Matsukata suggested the consolidation of the domestic oil
interests, asking the two largest domestic firms to merge but without
success ?Samuels : 169?.
In general, the government’s attitude toward oil was sporadic. For
example, in 1898 at the request of oil producers in Niigata, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce ?MAC? sent a mission to study the current oil
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situations in the United States and Russia. Included in the mission were
Hisahiro Naito, President of Nippon Oil, and Tokuza Mishima, Vice-
President of Zao Oil. While their first hand observation of overseas
development impressed them beyond description, this did not lead to a
comprehensive oil policy at the government’s level. The impact, if any, of
this mission on the government and the industry in Japan was, however, a
strengthened belief in the large development potential of oil within Japan.
There was no orchestration of fuels policy or strong bureaucratic
leadership in oil administration or policymaking within the Japanese
government at this stage. Its involvement was limited to some geological
surveys and funding for a pipeline between Kauizawa and Yokogawa in 1905.
?Samuels?. The government, however, legislated the Mining Act to regulate
the production of coal and precious metals rather than oil. The former were
essential commodities for state-led industrialization. The resultant
?????????? ?? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ? ??????????? In other words, it was not
only the private business interests which established the oil industry in
modern Japan, but also it was these interests that succeeded in the
continuation of a high tariff policy on imported crude oil during this area.
The contradictory interests of domestic oil producers and user industry
illustrated in the politics of oil tariffs characterised the oil policy process in
general. Many issues were viewed as a zero-sum game, in which one’s gain
was another’s loss, and was fought between domestic oil producers and
users, and in the case of Nanboku Oil, between integrated oil firms and a new
comer who wanted to be concentrated in downstream activities.
It was domestic oil producers and established integrated oil firms which
won the game. This was because the executives of the integrated Japanese
?
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companies such as Naito, President of Nippon Oil, had close ties with the
Imperial bureaucracy, and exerted influence on government policy, as seen in
their membership in the government’s oil study mission to the United States
and Russia, and in their subsequent report and policy recommendation. The
government’s decision was also coloured by its concern with making
domestic oil international competitive, and fostering the primitive domestic
industry, as well as by the merit of increased revenue. In determining oil
tariffs, the government was pressurized from competing business interests.
In this policy area, intense interest group politics emerged in Imperial Japan
?which was sometimes compared with absolutist monarchies in modern
European history? as early as the beginning of the twentieth century.
Until 1920, more than 95 per cent of oil imports consisted of kerosene.
Although there is no statistical figure on crude oil imports alone, the import
of crude and heavy oil combined had an estimated share of 513 per cent in
total oil imports until 1920. Only a small amount of crude oil was imported,
owing to high tariffs. As little domestic production was exported, and since
all of Japanese production was refined at home, it is reasonable to assume
that the refining output of Japanese oil companies increased approximately at
the same rate as the domestic oil production rate. That is to say, oil refining
output must have increased as oil production increased, from 666Kl reported
in 1874 to over 5,550Kl in 1885, a more than 10 fold increase. By the early
twentieth century, the production exceeded 138,000Kl, an almost 250 fold
increase from the 1874 figure, and a 25 fold increase from the 1885 level.
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Domestic oil production continued to grow until 1915, when it peaked at
471,436Kl.
In the growth of oil refining capacity, the government played an important
role by erecting a high tariff barrier against crude oil imports : this in turn
assisted the increased production of domestic oil and its refining. Such
growth was, however, market-driven in the sense that it was the drastic
increases in demand for oil products which promoted the oil interests to
increase domestic production. Even with increased production, however,
domestic oil never met demand at home, which was growing very fast, and
oil imports continued. Yet, without high tariffs on crude oil imports, the
refining capacity of the domestic industry should have had increased more
than what actually happened. If imported crude oil had been reprocessed in
Japan, the refining capacity and output would have been almost 85 per cent
larger in early years, and almost double the actual capacity by 1910. This is
because almost 85 per cent of domestic consumption was imported in the
form as kerosene in early days, and also because almost half of domestic
requirements were imported, mostly in the form of various oil products by
1915. Thus, high tariff policy deterred the growth of refining facilities. The
oil industry could have earned more if it had the reprocessing business of
imported crude oil.
If this is the case then, the high tariff policy adopted on crude oil imports
made it uneconomical for a even well-capitalized Rising-Sun, which had
access to reasonably priced oil in Asia and elsewhere, to continue the
practice of crude oil import and refining in Japan. The policy reduced
incentives for the oil industry to enter into the oil import and refining
business until the 1920s, when even with high tariffs imposed on crude oil,
?
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domestic oil became uncompetitive price-wise, and also short in supply.
Initially, however, the high tariff policy made a profound impact on the
industry ; it stopped crude oil imports business altogether. Furthermore, it
virtually prevented the accelerated growth of the refining sector with
imported crude oil. It not only created an artificial entry barrier into crude oil
import business, but also confined the industry to the production and refining
of domestic oil, or to the import and sales business of oil products. In short,
by adapting such a policy, the government deterred the development of the
oil refining sector in capacity and output. Furthermore, owing to the high
tariff policy, major Japanese oil firms emerged as integrated oil companies.
Smaller companies and international majors established themselves as oil
product importers and distributors, with the exception of Rising Sun between
1909 and 1915.
Internationally, Standard and Shell were engaged in price wars in an effort
to increase their market share in each other’s home market and around the
world. Their rivalry constantly brought fierce price cutting competition into
the Japanese market as well. This caused great stress to both foreign and
domestic oil interests in Japan, especially to the latter, as domestic oil
continued to be more expensive than imported oil. Starting in 1910, the four
leading Japanese and foreign oil interests made several attempts to
consolidate the market through a four-way sales agreement, but without
much success.
The failure was related to a world-wide supply surplus of oil which
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resulted from new discoveries of large oil fields, including a huge oil find in
Iran in 1915, which was capable of producing 40,000 barrels per day, a series
of significant oil discoveries in Texas in 1917, and additional large oil finds in
Sumatra, and three large oil finds in California as well as the entry of
Venezuela into the international oil market.
In Japan, domestic oil production peaked in 1915, with an output of 470,000
Kl, whereas demands for oil continued to grow as an increasing number of
manufacturers, motor vehicles and vessels used fuel for power and refined oil
products for lubrication. Moreover, the price gap between imported and
domestically-produced oil widened. At times, imported oil cost some 1015
yen per 180Kl ?US$ 4.77.1 per barrel?, whereas domestic oil was 20 yen for
the same quantity ?US$ 9.4 per barrel?, even with increased tariffs ?Daikyo :
16?.
??????? ???? ??????????, in 1921 small oil producers in Niigata
attempted to rationalize their production and distribution system, by setting
up joint oil imports and sales networks and product swap systems. They also
began to import crude oil jointly through Rising Sun ?Daikyo : 610?. In the
following year Asahi Oil Concluded an agreement with Rising Sun, and by
leasing and reopening the latter’s Fukuoka refinery, it entered into the oil
import and refining business. In the same year, Hoden and Nippon Oil
decided to merge and formed a new Nippon oil, each providing equal capital.
Some medium-sized oil firms such as Ogura Oil also began to import and
refine crude oil.
In 1923 the new Nippon Oil, which produced approximately 80 per cent of
domestic crude oil, also followed this market practice. It began to import
crude oil from Southeast Asia and processed it at its Niigata refinery. In the
?
?
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following year, the company built a new refinery in Tsurumi near Tokyo on
the Pacific Coast, and expanded its refining operation based on imported
crude oil. Ogura Oil and Mitsubishi Oil, the latter being a joint venture
between Mitsubishi Group and Associated Oil of the United States, also set
up refineries in Yokohama and Kawasaki respectively. Thus, the market
entry was still relatively open and easy and many companies joined the oil
business.
With these new developments, the centre of the oil business moved from
the Sea of Japan side to the Pacific Coast side. Furthermore, imported oil
firmly established its status as the major source of oil in the Japanese market.
This meant that within Japan the operation of the oil business shifted toward
downstream activities. This move was later termed as the practice of ‘refin-
ing crude oil on the consumers’ doorstep’, which in the postwar era formed
official policy until 1986. It was increasing demand for oil supplies and not
the government’s policy which began this practice.
??? The Navy’s Switch to Fuels and Interest Group Politics
By the end of the First World War, increased dependency on imported oil
became a great concern for the Imperial government because of the newly
emerged strategic implications of oil. After some twenty years of research
and preparation, the Imperial Navy built its first oil fuelled ship in 1919 and
all their ships built thereafter used residual oil for power ?Inokuchi : 196?.
Long before then, in 1911, the United Kingdom, the world’s most powerful
sea power, had already decided to switch from coal to oil as fuel for the
operation of its vessels. With this shift in policy, the Royal Navy was also
concerned with securing fuel on a constant basis. Winston Churchill, then
T
h
e
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
an
d
In
d
u
strial
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
in
M
o
d
e
rn
Jap
an
????132? ???? 65? 1? ?2014? 5??
First Lord of the Admiralty, persuaded the government to purchase a
majority stake in Anglo-Persian Oil, the former body of British Petroleum in
1914 ?Sampson : 72?.
In 1919, in order to secure oil supply, the Japanese Navy entered into a
long-term purchase agreement with Rising Sun. The oil company agreed that
it supply the Navy fifty thousand tons and forty thousand tons of residual fuel
oil per year, from Borneo and California respectively ?Inokuchi : 196 ;
Samuels : 173?. Furthermore, the Imperial Navy set up its own production
facility in Tokuyama in 1921, and later in Yokkaichi and Ofima. It also
engaged in the development of synthetic fuel. Thus at least by the end of the
First World War, the Japanese Navy had begun to examine oil policy, and to
take some actions in the oil economy.
Interestingly, the Imperial Navy had no xenophobia or concern to enter
into a contract with oil suppliers whose nationality was not Japanese. The
importance of oil for national defense was widely recognized during the First
World War internationally, as Anthony Sampson captures this point so well
in the following passage :
The First World War made all Western governments painfully aware of
the importance of oil for survival, and led to the development of what
was called “oleaginous diplomacy”. The dependence on oil for survival
became obvious as the war extended - fought with planes, cars, and
tanks - and the oil tankers were critical for suppliers. “Oil”, said
Clemenceau, “is as necessary as blood”. “We must have oil”, said Foch,
“or we shall lose the war”. “The Allies”, said Lord Curzon in a phrase
much quoted by oilmen “floated to victory on a wave of oil”. The
Germans were desperately short of oil, while Britain had access to the
?
?
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Persian oil from BP at Abada, and to Shell Oil from Mexico and the East
Indies. ?Sampson : 72?
During the First World War and in the post-WWI era, however, the largest
supplier of oil was the United States. It supplied 80 per cent of oil require-
ments of the Allied Powers ?Sampson?. Japan was also dependent on
American supplies.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy’s new move into oil production alarmed
domestic oil firms, as this was considered as interference into their spheres
of business. Their protests successfully prevented the government from
moving into sales of by-products released from the Navy’s facility. All these
products were sold to the oil companies for resale, rather than directly into
the market ?Samuels : 171?.
Fearing that the government entry into their business would decrease
their market share and profit-making potential, that is to say, viewing the
situation as a zero-sum game, the oil firms were engaged in interest group
politics and successfully achieved their goal. Yet, of equal importance is the
fact that the societal interests never challenged the essence of the govern-
ment’s policy, i.e., the Imperial Navy’s decision to enter into oil importing
and refining business on its own, and more importantly, its prior decision to
fuel its vessels with oil. The issue of how to distribute the by-products of the
refined oil was a secondary matter from the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy.
Again, it is interesting to note that domestic oil interests were active in
voicing their concerns and views concerning the Imperial Navy’s policy
matters, and that they obtained what they wanted.
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??? Conclusion
The oil industry in modern Japan was not developed by the government.
Rather it emerged with the initiatives of a large number of small
entrepreneurs. The business was not stable, as all of them were small and
financially fragile enterprises. Yet, among them, Hoden and Nippon Oil
emerged as business leaders. Foreign oil interests, namely, Standard and
Rising Sun, also established their presence firmly, first as importers and
distributors of refined oil products, and soon in the early twentieth century,
as the importer, refiner and distributor of crude oil from abroad, as well as
the seller of oil products.
In the very beginning, the growth of this industry was determined by the
market appetite for oil products. Most oil companies grew business through
production, refining and selling of lamp oil, the single major product
demanded in the Japanese market. By the time oil lamps were replaced by
gas and electric lamps by the first decade of the twentieth century, demand
for other oil products increased with the acceleration of industrialization and
motorization.
The Imperial government encouraged rapid industrialization program
under the slogan of ‘Wealthy Nation, Strong Army’. Yet, it did not lead the
oil business by setting up model factories, as in the case of textiles. It did not
provide tax or financial incentives either, for exploration at home or
overseas. This meant that not only the growth but also the performance of
the industry was largely determined by demand and supply in the market,
and also by competition between oil firms both in and outside Japan. Overall
then, the initial development of the Japanese oil industry was hardly state-
?
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led.
Interest group politics in the oil policy process can be traced back to the
late nineteenth century, when domestic producers pressured the govern-
ment to impose the first tariffs on imported oil. Although the political system
of Imperial Japan was in no way democratic, private interests were quite
influential in some policy processes. The government stake in the oil
industry at that time was small, because its main product was lamp oil, and
this occupied only a small proportion of Japan’s import bill. Furthermore, it
was not used a primary source of fueling industrialization or motorization.
The relatively low salience of oil made it easy for private business
interests to affect and determine international trade policy whenever they
viewed policy issues as a zero-sum game, or whenever they thought that the
outcome of the policy affected their economic well-being. Interest group
politics on oil tariffs at the turn of the century and onwards, as well as the
prevention of the Navy’s entry into the oil product sales business in the early
1920s are prime examples for this.
It was not until the First World War, when the navy converted to residual
oil as fuel for its vessels that the government began to be seriously
concerned with the strategic implications of oil and the oil industry. From
then onward, the Imperial government became engaged in the issue of
securing of oil for national defense purposes. This issue needs to be
examined by further studies.
What this study can conclude, however, is that the tariff policy made a
greater impact on the initial development of the oil industry than the
conventional study contends. It virtually blocked the economic feasibility of
crude oil imports and refining as a business strategy for all the oil companies.
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The tariff policy promoted the imports of refined products and prevented the
industry from expanding the refining facilities further. Thus, it made a
negative impact on the growth of the oil refining sector.
The question is, however, how influential was the government in making
such an international trade policy? Did it come from within the govern-
ment? This study has demonstrated that high tariffs policy was not the
government’s own idea or initiative ; it adopted such a policy under intensive
pressure from domestic oil producers. In this sense, it was not the
government, but the private business interests which led to the erection of
high tariff barriers which influenced the oil business in such a significant way.
The high tariffs policy, however, had to change eventually as domestic
crude oil production became too expensive, and could not meet growing
demands. Soon crude oil imports and refining replaced domestic production
as the major line of oil business in Japan. Again, this policy change was not
induced by the government, but was made by market forces.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the government acted like
an umpire or referee of interest group politics. It made little direct impact on
the initial development of the oil industry in modern Japan in terms of
capitalization, structure or performance of the industry. The entry barrier to
the oil market was extremely low, and many entrepreneurs entered into oil
business. The oil industry was fragile, and the number of the firms, their
market share and financial performance changed rapidly in the early years.
Among them, Hoden and Nippon Oil emerged as the two major leaders and
then, these two firms were merged into a new Nippon Oil. Yet, in
comparison to the Rising Sun and Standard, major foreign oil firms which
entered the Japanese market, their resources were highly limited.
?
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The initial development of the Japanese oil industry was also deeply
affected by the international political economy. The rivalry between oil
majors and an international oil supply surplus resulted in the constant price-
cutting competition which characterized the Japanese market in the 1910s
and onwards. The geo-political considerations of the great powers,
especially, the switch to fuel-powered engines in the Royal Navy, the
greatest sea power at that time, spurred the change to the same fuel in
Japan’s Imperial Navy. This policy shift, together with growing application
and use of oil for industrialization and motorization led to the rise of
industrial policy during the interwar period ; but this has to be examined in
a separate study.
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Appendix 1 The Growth and Performance of Nippon Oil, 18881920?
Year
?A?
Authorised
Capital
?Yen?
?B?
Paid Out
Capital
?Yen?
?Q
Profi
t
?Yen?
CB
Return on
Capital
???
CD?
Dividend
???
1888 150,000 7,500 1,622 21.63 10
1889 150,000 15,000 11,514 76.76 10
1890 150,000 22,500 10,013 44.50 20
1891 150,000 30,000 16,764 55.88 20
1892 150,000 37,500 15,052 40.14 20
1893 150,000 75,000 26,262 35.02 20
1894 300,000 112,500 49,007 43.56 20
1895 600,000 150,000 64,292 42.86 20
1896 600,000 240,000 40,559 16.90 14
1897 600,000 300,000 70,434 23.48 18
1898 600,000 360,000 5,055 1.40 
1899a 600,000 360,000 120,746 33.54 40
1899b 600,000 396,000 254,123 64.17 40
1900a 600,000 600,000 252,622 42.10 40
1900b 1,200,000 750,000 220,500 29.40 40
1901a 1,200,000 900,000 264,148 29.35 40
1901b 1,200,000 975,000 434,008 44.51 40
1902a 1,200,000 1,200,000 223,124 18.59 24
1902b 2,400,000 1,500,000 301,306 20.09 24
1903a 2,400,000 1,500,000 307,035 20.47 24
1903b 2,400,000 1,500,000 358,178 23.88 28
1904a 2,400,000 1,632,000 332,350 20.36 24
1904b 2,400,000 1,752,000 400,338 22.85 24
1905a 2,400,000 1,896,000 278,958 14.71 20
1905b 2,400,000 1,896,000 319,657 16.86 20
1906a 2,400,000 1,896,000 330,469 17.43 20
1906b 2,400,000 2,400,000 436,179 18.17 24
1907a 5,000,000 5,000,000 805,402 16.11 32
1907b 10,000,000 6,250,000 916,064 14.66 24
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1908a 10,000,000 8,400,000 1,042,555 12.41 24
1908b 10,000,000 9,200,000 1,369,090 14.88 24
1909a 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,012,502 10.13 20
1909b 10,000,000 10,000,000 963,970 9.64 18
1910a 10,000,000 10,000,000 948,064 9.48 16
1910b 10,000,000 10,000,000 523,599 5.24 12
1911a 10,000,000 10,000,000 693,655 6.94 12
1911b 10,000,000 10,000,000 682,668 6.83 12
1912a 10,000,000 10,000,000 802,106 8.02 12
1912b 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,262,150 12.62 16
1913a 20,000,000 12,500,000 1,609,114 12.87 20
1913b 20,000,000 12,500,000 1,540,869 12.33 20
1914a 20,000,000 12,500,000 1,101,570 8.81 20
1914b 20,000,000 16,500,000 1,758,790 10.66 20
1915a 20,000,000 16,500,000 1,663,821 10.08 20
1915b 20,000,000 16,500,000 1,870,544 11.34 20
1916a 20,000,000 16,500,000 2,477,752 15.02 20
1916b 20,000,000 16,500,000 2,957,105 17.92 30
1917a 20,000,000 16,000,000 2,719,223 17.00 20
1917b 20,000,000 18,500,000 2,742,213 14.82 25
1918a 20,000,000 20,000,000 2,960,210 14.80 25
1918b 40,000,000 25,000,000 5,178,753 20.72 25
1919a 40,000,000 25,000,000 5,737,388 22.95 25
1919b 40,000,000 25,000,000 6,266,262 25.07 35
1920a 40,000,000 25,000,000 5,176,928 20.71 35
1920b 40,000,000 25,000,000 5,231,498 20.93 35
Sources : Tosuke Inokuchi, op.cit., Appendix pp. 2425.
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Appendix 2 The Growth and Performance of Hoden Oil, 18941920
Year
?A?
Authorised
Capital
?Yen?
O?
Paid Out
Capital
?Yen?
?Q I
Profit
?Yen?
CB
Return on
Capital ???
?D?
Dividend
???
1894a 15,000 3,750 2,381 63.49 90
1894b 15,000 6,000 2,491 41.52 75
1895a 30,000 14,400 2,816 19.56 33
1895b 30,000 15,960 1,619 10.14 20
1896a 30,000 18,000 10,542 58.57 100
1896b 50,000 35,000 11,820 33.77 57
1897a 102,000 102,000 20,286 19.89 33
1897b 250,000 120,000 19,304 16.09 30
1898a 300,000 170,250 34,939 20.52 32
1898b 300,000 191,875 33,126 17.26 25
1899a 300,000 213,500 29,086 13.62 12
1899b 300,000 213,500 38,316 17.95 12
1900a 600,000 450,000 110,345 24.52 40
1900b 600,000 525,000 138,563 26.39 48
1901a 600,000 600,000 132,475 22.08 32
1901b 600,000 600,000 143,547 23.92 40
1902a 600,000 600,000 175,133 29.19 48
1902b 1,500,000 1,500,000 348,867 23.26 32
1903a 1,500,000 1,500,000 350,042 23.34 40
1903b 1,500,000 1,500,000 354,572 23.64 48
1904a 1,500,000 1,500,000 418,862 27.92 40
1904b 1,500,000 1,500,000 447,094 29.81 40
1905a 1,500,000 1,500,000 478,464 31.90 40
1905b 3,000,000 3,000,000 715,242 23.84 40
1906a 3,000,000 3,000,000 601,671 20.06 40
1906b 3,000,000 3,000,000 598,903 19.96 36
1907a 3,000,000 3,000,000 658,169 21.94 30
1907b 4,000,000 4,000,000 1,371,635 34.29 36
1908a 10,000,000 6,250,000 1,325,117 21.20 36
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1908b 10,000,000 6,250,000 1,367,068 21.87 36
1909a 10,000,000 6,900,000 1,454,954 21.09 36
1909b 11,650,000 9,150,000 1,604,416 17.53 30
1910a 11,650,000 9,150,000 925,832 10.12 20
1910b 11,650,000 10,400,000 833,428 8.01 15
1911a 11,650,000 11,650,000 1,008,721 8.66 12
1911b 15,000,000 12,487,500 769,252 6.16 10
1912a 15,000,000 12,487,500 713,685 5.72 12
1912b 15,000,000 13,325,000 918,634 6.89 12
1913a 15,000,000 13,325,000 1,024,517 7.69 12
1913b 15,000,000 13,325,000 1,111,504 8.34 14
1914a 15,000,000 13,325,000 1,414,591 10.62 18
1914b 15,000,000 14,162,500 1,213,788 8.57 15
1915a 15,000,000 14,162,500 1,181,019 8.34 15
1915b 15,000,000 15,000,000 998,164 6.65 12
1916a 15,000,000 15,000,000 1,086,948 7.25 12
1916b 15,000,000 15,000,000 1,363,374 9.09 14
1917a 20,000,000 16,250,000 1,655,121 10.19 15
1917b 20,000,000 16,250,000 2,101,001 12.93 18
1918a 20,000,000 16,250,000 2,963,812 18.24 20
1918b 20,000,000 16,250,000 2,692,086 16.57 20
1919a 20,000,000 16,250,000 3,152,420 19.40 25
1919b 20,000,000 16,250,000 3,046,057 18.74 25
1920a 20,000,000 16,250,000 4,223,000 25.99 30
1920b 20,000,000 16,250,000 7,221,328 44.44 40
Sources : Tosuke Inokuchi, op.cit, Appendix pp. 35.
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Notes
* The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 13th Annual Japanese
Politics Colloquium held at East Asia Institute, Clare College, University of
Cambridge, 12 Aprial, 2005. This is part of a major research project funded by
the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong ?Project ID : 2110094 Ref. CUHK
4395 /04H?. I am grateful to the Council for generous support and funding as
well as research assistance provided by Jenny Eagleton and Jeff Wood formerly
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. I also express deep appreciation for
invaluable assistance provided by Professor Craig W. Mark of the School of
International Studies as well as by Ms. Miho Chujo and Ms. Tomoko Yamasoe
in the Technical Support Office in the School of Law and Politics, Kwansei
Gakuin University. The operationalization of the concept “industrial develop-
ment” in this study is based on a framework of analysis presented in the
author’s work ?1996?.
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